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ON THE AUTHORITY OF THE TWO-MEMBER
NLRB: STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
APPROACHES AND JUDICIAL CHOICES
Ronald Turner*
"quorum: The minimum number of members (usu. a majority of all
the members) who must be presentfor a deliberative assembly to legally
transactbusiness. "
"[Jiudging is both robotic and discretionary. When precedent or
text provides a judge with a genuine external command, a judge's job is
to obey .... But when neither clear precedent norfirm textual guidance
is present, judicial choices must be made. There are no ties in
judging. -2
I. INTRODUCTION

Is the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "Board")
statutorily empowered to issue decisions and orders when the
membership of this five-member agency falls below three? This
important question has been considered by federal courts of appeals in
recent rulings addressing challenges to the Board's adjudicatory power
and decision-making authority.
On December 16, 2007, the term of Board Chairman Robert J.

Battista expired. Thereafter, on December 20, 2007, Board Members
Wilma Liebman, Peter Schaumber, Peter Kirsanow, and Dennis Walsh
delegated to Liebman, Schaumber, and Kirsanow, "as a three-member
group, all of the Board's powers in anticipation of the expiration of the

* Alumnae Law Center Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. J.D., University of
Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., Wilberforce University. The author acknowledges and is thankful
for the research support provided by the Alumnae Law Center donors and the University of Houston
Law Foundation. Special thanks to my colleagues Darren Bush and Aaron Bruhl and to the
members of the fall 2009 University of Houston Law Center labor law class for sharing their views
on the issues addressed in this essay.
1.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1284 (8th ed. 2008).

2.

Burt Neuborne, Judging is Both Robotic and Discretionary,NAT'L L.J., July 27, 2009, at

43.
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terms of Members Kirsanow and Walsh on December 28, 2007;" that
delegation was effective midnight December 28, 2007. 3 As stated in the
Board's December 20 minutes, the agency took this action because "in
the near future [the Board] may for a temporary period have fewer than
three Members," and the two remaining Members would be able to
"issue decisions and orders in unfair labor practice and representation
cases after [the] departure of Members Kirsanow and Walsh . . . ." The
Board also relied on a March 2003 opinion from the Department of
Justice's Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC") which concluded that "if the
Board delegated all of its powers to a group of three members, that
group could continue to issue decisions and orders as long as a quorum
of two members6 remained. 5 The Board "agreed to be bound by" the
OLC's opinion.
The terms of Members Kirsanow and Walsh, both serving recess
appointments by President George W. Bush, expired on December 31,
2007. Thus, beginning on January 1, 2008 and continuing to date, the7
NLRB has had only two members, Member (now Chairman) Liebman
and Member Schaumber. 8 That duo announced that they "constitute a
quorum of the three-member group" to which the Board's power was
delegated in December 2007, and that "[a]s a quorum, they have the
authority to issue decisions and orders in unfair labor practice and

3. Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, LLC, 352 N.L.R.B. 179, 179 n.4 (2008) (noting
the 2007 delegation), petitionfor review granted,564 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
4. Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 469, 471 (D.C. Cir.
2009) (quoting the Board's December 20, 2007 meeting minutes).
5. Quorum Requirements, 27 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 1, 2; see also infra note 96 and
accompanying text.
6. Quorum Requirements, supra note 5, at n.1 (citing Letter from Henry S. Breiteneicher,
Acting Solicitor, National Labor Relations Board, to Jay Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office
of Legal Counsel (May 16, 2002) (on file with author)).
7. Liebman was designated Chairman of the Board by President Barack Obama on January
20, 2009. Press Release, NLRB, Wilma Liebman Designated NLRB Chairman (Jan. 22, 2009) (on
file with the Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal). The Obama administration nominated
Craig Becker, Mark Gaston Pearce, and Brian Hayes as Board members. See White House
Announces Two Board Member Nominees, US FED. NEWS, Apr. 20, 2009; President Obama
Announces Intent to Nominate Brian Hayes as National Labor Relations Board Member, US FED.
NEWS, July 10, 2009. In October 2009 the United States Senate's Health, Education, Labor and
Pensions Committee approved the nominations by a vote of 15-8, and Senator John McCain (R.Ariz.) placed a hold on the nomination of Becker. See Seth Stem, Labor Board Nominee Faces
Opposition From McCain, CQ TODAY Oct. 21, 2009. Becker's nomination was not confirmed
before Congress adjourned in December 2009, President Obama will renominate Becker and seek
Senate confirmation in the second session of the Ill th Congress. See Charlie Savage, President is
Saidto Renominate Six Choices, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 8, 2010, at A 16.
8. See Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, LLC, 352 N.L.R.B. 179, 179 n.4 (2008)
(discussing that Members Liebman and Schaumber are the only remaining members of the NLRB).
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representation cases." 9 Making clear their "dedicat[ion] to resolving
cases and to avoiding a decisional backlog," Liebman and Schaumber
have issued more than 400 two-member Board decisions.1 °
Parties aggrieved by the Liebman-Schaumber decisions have
challenged those rulings in the federal courts of appeals, arguing that the
two-member panel does not constitute a quorum of the Board as
mandated by section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"
or "Act").'l Section 3(b) provides, in pertinent part:
The Board is authorized to delegate to any group of three or more
members any or all of the powers which it may itself exercise .... A
vacancy in the Board shall not impair the right of the remaining
members to exercise all of the powers of the Board, and three members
of the Board shall, at all times, constitute a quorum of the Board,
except that two members shall constitute a quorum of any group
12
....
designated pursuant to the first sentence hereof
Does the Liebman-Schaumber panel constitute a valid quorum of
the Board under and within the meaning of section 3(b)? The United
States Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Fourth, Seventh, and
affirmative. 13
Tenth Circuits, have answered that question in the
Reaching a contrary conclusion, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit has ruled that the two active Board
members do not constitute a section 3(b) quorum and are therefore not
authorized to issue decisions and orders. 14
The aforementioned circuit split presents a cutting-edge issue of
federal labor law. If the quorum findings of the NLRB and the First,
Second, Fourth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits are correct, the twomember panel's decisions were lawful exercises of the agency's
authority and are insulated from the procedural challenges raised by
aggrieved parties subject to the Board's rulings and orders. The
converse view expressed by the D.C. Circuit-that two-member
decisions are unlawful and therefore unenforceable actions by an unduly
9. Id. (citing National Labor Relations Act § 3(b), 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (2006)).
10. Press Release, Wilma Liebman, NLRB Chairman, on D.C. Circuit's Decision in Laurel
Baye v. NLRB (May 1, 2009) (on file with author).
11. See, e.g., Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir.
2009); Ne. Land Servs., Ltd. v. NLRB, 560 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2009); New Process Steel, L.P. v.
NLRB, 564 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2009).
12. National Labor Relations Act § 3(b), 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (2006).
13. See Ne. Land Serv., 560 F.3d at 41; Snell Island SNF LLC v. NLRB, 568 F.3d 410, 424
(2d Cir. 2009); Narricot Indus., L.P. v. NLRB, 587 F.3d 654 (4th Cir. 2009); New Process Steel,
564 F.3d at 848; Teamsters Local 523 v. NLRB, 590 F.3d 849 (10th Cir. 2009).
14. See Laurel Baye, 564 F.3d at 476.
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constituted Board-provides a basis for challenging the large number of
cases decided by the Liebman-Schaumber Board. As the "question
regarding the jurisdiction of the NLRB's two-member panel is one
ultimately to be resolved by the Supreme Court,"' 5 an examination of the
quorum issue and the courts' resolutions thereof is timely and warranted.
This essay's consideration of the two-member panel's power and
authority, or lack thereof, unfolds as follows. Answering the question
whether the two-member Board is a valid quorum under and within the
meaning of the Act is ultimately a query requiring judicial construction
of section 3(b). As discussed in Part II, courts engaged in the enterprise
of resolving disputes regarding the contested readings and meanings of
statutory provisions select from a menu of statutory interpretation
theories and methodologies. Part II's overview of certain interpretive
theories and approaches serves as a prefatory framing of Part III's
examination of the section 3(b) quorum analyses and rulings of the First,
Second, Fourth, Seventh, Tenth and District of Columbia Circuits. Part
III's discussion and evaluation of this circuit split focuses on the
interpretive theories adopted, methodologies employed, and adjudicative
choices made by the courts, and argues that section 3(b) is best read and
understood as deauthorizing the two-member NLRB.
1I. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: THEORIES AND METHODOLOGIES

In this "age of statutes," 1 6 the federal judiciary performs the critical

institutional role and function of interpreting and applying statutes in
cases and controversies brought to the courts for adjudication and
decision. It has been urged that the judiciary, acting within the
separation-of-powers structure of the Constitution17 (a structure
15. Snell Island, 568 F.3d at 419.
16. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (Harvard
Univ. Press 1982).
17. The United States Congress legislates and passes laws via the process of bicameral
enactment and presentment to the President. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. The executive
branch enforces those duly enacted laws, see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, and the judiciary interprets
and applies those laws in deciding specified cases and controversies, see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2;
see generally INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (discussing the functions of Congress and the
President in the legislative process); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (Supreme
Court's explication of the judicial power and power ofjudicial review of legislative enactments).
Professor John Manning notes that the "bicameralism and presentment requirements of Article I
give political minorities extraordinary power to block legislative change or to insist upon
compromise as the price of assent." John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in
Constitutional Interpretation,122 HARV. L. REv. 2004, 2016 (2009) (citation omitted) [hereinafter
Manning, Federalism]. The legislative process thus "necessitates compromise. And any theory of
interpretation that rests on a theory of the legislative process must deal with that reality .... " Id.
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popularized by Baron de Montesquieu prior to the founding of the
United States), 18 is subordinate to the legislature. 19 From that posited
lower ranked position, the judiciary should and must only declare what
the law is, and should not make law or "substitute [its] own policy
preferences through the creation and application of public values canons
of Congress as articulated in the words and history of
for the preferences
20
the statute.",

Viewing the judicial function and power differently, others have
argued that it is inevitable and necessary that judges do and will make
law and policy. 21 This is true because it is predictable that legislators

cannot anticipate all of the post-enactment issues and questions that will
arise with regard to the operative meaning of a statutory provision in
specific cases, circumstances, and contexts.2 2 As stated by H.L.A. Hart:
[Hluman legislators can have no .. .knowledge of all the possible

combinations or circumstances which the future may bring.

This

inability to anticipate brings with it a relative indeterminacy of aim....
18. See generally BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS: A COMPENDIUM OF

THE FIRST ENGLISH EDITION (David W. Carrithers ed., Univ. of Cal. Press 1977). Bruce Ackerman
has noted Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' observation that Montesquieu's "England-the England
of the threefold division of power into legislative, executive and judicial-was a fiction invented by
him, a fiction which misled Blackstone and Delome ..... " Bruce Ackerman, The Living
Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1795 n.181 (2007) (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES,
Montesquieu, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 250, 263 (1920)); see also ROBERT SHACKLETON,
MONTESQUIEU: A CRITICAL BIOGRAPHY 300-01 (Oxford Univ. Press 1961).
19. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, StatutoryInterpretation and Literary Theory: Some Common
Concerns of an Unlikely Pair,in INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIC READER

116 (Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux eds., Northwestern Univ. Press 1988).
20. Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Presumption of Reviewability: A Study in Canonical
Construction and Its Consequences,45 VAND. L. REV. 743, 744 (1992).
21. See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 546 (1991) (White, J.,
concurring) (stating that "judges in a real sense 'make' law"); RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES
THINK 81 (Harvard Univ. Press 2008) (arguing that appellate judges "are occasionallegislators");
RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 61 (Harvard Univ. Press 2003)
("[Jiudges make up much of the law that they are purporting to be merely applying ....[W]hile the
judiciary is institutionally and procedurally distinct from the other branches of the government, it
shares lawmaking power with the legislative branch."); Ray Forrester, Truth in Judging: Supreme
Court Opinions as Legislative Drafting, 38 VAND. L. REv. 463, 464 (1985) (positing that "it is
commonplace to recognize that the Supreme Court is a lawmaking body"); Erwin N. Griswold,
Cutting the Cloak to Fit the Cloth: An Approach to Problems in the FederalCourts, 32 CATH. U. L.
REV. 787, 801 (1983) ("Everyone knows that judges do make law, and should make law. It is rather
a question of how much law they should make.").
22. See NBD Bank, N.A. v. Bennett, 67 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 1995).
No Member of Congress can anticipate all questions that will come to light; and a body containing

hundred of members with divergent agendas can't answer even a small portion of the questions that
do occur to its members. That is one reason why Congress frequently delegates power to executive
officials.
Id.
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When the unenvisaged case does arise, we confront the issues at stake
and can then settle the question by choosing between the competing
interests in the way that best satisfies us. In doing so, we shall have
rendered more determinate our initial aim, and shall incidentally have
settled a question as to the meaning, for the purposes of th[e] rule, of a
general word.23

Where unenvisaged cases arise, courts may be called on to fill
statutory gaps 24 and must sometimes decide cases on grounds, rules and
standards 25 not explicitly found in statutory text. In those circumstances,
judges-engaged in the enterprise of interpreting and construing statutes
in cases presenting adversarial parties' contested readings and
applications of statutory provisions-have developed and may select
from a menu of interpretive approaches as they seek to "reach accurate
outcomes or promote other policy goals in deciding cases and
controversies. 2 6 Some of these methodologies are discussed in this
7
part.

2

23. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 128-29 (2d ed., Clarendon Press 1994); see also
FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, RULES AND ORDERS 119 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1973) (noting that as "new
situations in which the established rules are not adequate will constantly arise," judges must make
new rules). Adrian Vermeule, while agreeing with Hart that "legislative foresight is necessarily
limited," has "notice[d] Hart's apparently unself-conscious use of the word 'we' to identify the
interpreting authority."

ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL

THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 25 (Harvard Univ. Press 2006). "Of course, Hart's readers do
not constitute a community of 'we's' who have the power to adopt a mutually agreeable approach to
interpretation ....[A] system of interpretation must be established that some 'they' must apply'they' being judges, agencies, and other officials... " Id. at 25-26.
24. Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Peter W. Huber, The IntercircuitCommittee, 100 HARv. L. REV.
1417, 1420 (1987).
The national legislature expresses itself too often in commands that are unclear,
imprecise, or gap-ridden .... [Such statutes] are susceptible of diverse interpretation,
they inspire litigation and, as D.C. Circuit Judge Harry Edwards observed, they prompt
"disagreement among different judges and panels," yielding "inconsistency and
unpredictability in the interpretation of the law."
Id. (quoting Harry T. Edwards, The Role of a Judge in Modern Society: Some Reflections on
CurrentPracticein FederalAppellate Adjudication, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 385, 425-26 (1984)); see
also BENJAMIN N. CARDOzO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 113-14 (Yale Univ. Press
1921) ("[The judge] legislates only between gaps. He fills the open spaces in the law. How far he
may go without traveling beyond the walls of the interstices cannot be staked out for him upon a
chart."); see generally Henry J. Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking-Judges Who Can't and
Legislators Who Won 't, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 787 (1963) (discussing the dilemma of legislators'
failure to correct legislative errors and judges inability to rewrite the law).
25. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106
HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992) (discussing litigative rules and standards).
26. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 2085, 2107-08 (2002).
27. This discussion of interpretive approaches and methodologies is not and is not intended to
be exhaustive. For additional materials and sources, see FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (Stanford Univ. Press 2009); REED DICKERSON, THE
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A. Intentionalism

One approach to statutory interpretation, known as intentionalism,
seeks to discern the meaning and understanding of a statutory provision
as held by the legislature and the legislators who enacted the law.2 8 That

intent may be found in the statutory text and/or in legislative history
(conference and committee reports, floor debates, statements by a bill's
sponsors and cosponsors, etc.). 29 "The primary rationale for crediting
legislative history as helping to resolve or amplify textual meaning is

that statutes are more than disembodied textual products-they are a
form of communication that reflects a purposive group effort. 30 Intent
may be determined by a reconstruction analysis in which a judge
attempts to "put himself in the shoes of the enacting legislators and
figure out how
they would have wanted the statute applied to the case
'
before him."'
Intentionalism has been criticized for the methodology's search for
the "obvious fiction" of the intent of a multimember legislature whose
participants did not have or may not have had any specific intent with
regard to the particular issue before the court. And the Supreme Court

INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES (Little, Brown & Co. 1975); EINER ELHAUGE,
STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET UNCLEAR LEGISLATION (Harvard Univ. Press
2008); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (Harvard Univ. Press
1994); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION (Univ. of Chicago Press 1991); ANDREI MARMOR, INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL
THEORY (rev. 2d ed., Hart Publishing 2005); WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT: THE
HISTORY AND THEORY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (Duke Univ. Press 1999); ADRIAN
AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL
VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
INTERPRETATION (Harvard Univ. Press 2006); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law

System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 1, 14-37 (Amy Guttman ed.,
Princeton Univ. Press 1997).
28. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical

Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321, 326 (1990).
29. See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S.
CAL. L. REv. 845, 848 (1992) ("Legislative history helps a court understand the context and purpose
of a statute. Outside the law we often turn to context and purpose to clarify ambiguity."); see also
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 28, at 326-27; James N. Landis, A Note on "Statutory
Interpretation", 43 HARV. L. REV. 886, 888-89 (1930).

30. James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Warp and Woof of Statutory Interpretation:
Comparing Supreme CourtApproaches in Tax Law and Workplace Law, 58 DUKE L.J. 1231, 1243
(2009).
31. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 286-87 (Harvard Univ.
Press 1985); see also Bumet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280, 285 (1933) (claiming that a judge
should ask "which choice is it the more likely that Congress would have made?").
32. See LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES: MORALITY, RULES,
AND THE DILEMMAS OF LAW 119 (Duke Univ. Press 2001); ESKRIDGE, supra note 27, at 16
("[L]egislators usually do not have a specific intention on more than a few issues (if that) in any bill
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has expressed the view that legislative history is not "subject to the
requirements of Article I" of the Constitution and "may give
unrepresentative committee members-or, worse yet, unelected staffers
and lobbyists-both the power and the incentive to attempt strategic
manipulations of legislative history to secure results they were unable to
achieve through the statutory text."3 3 Furthermore, and because
"legislative history is itself often murky, ambiguous, and contradictor..
. [j]udicial investigation of legislative history has a tendency to become,
to borrow Judge Leventhal's memorable phrase,
an exercise in 'looking
34
friends."
your
out
picking
and
crowd
a
over
B. Purposivism
As another interpretive approach, purposivism identifies a statute's
purpose and objective "and then. . . determin[es] which interpretation is
most consistent with that purpose or goal. Purposivism . . . allows a
statute to evolve ... while ensuring legitimacy by tying interpretation to
original legislative expectations. 3 5 The purposivist thus focuses on
statutory purpose "derive[d] not only from the text simpliciter, but also
from an understanding what social problems 36 the legislature was
addressing and what general ends it was seeking.,
As Judge Richard Posner has noted, "American judges have been
for which they vote. Legislators routinely vote for legislation simply because their president, their
party leaders, or relevant interest groups favor it."); see also Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 30, at
1244.
33. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005); see also Brudney
& Ditslear, supra note 30, at 1244 (noting critics' argument that legislative history "is neither voted
on by Congress nor presented to the president, and the views of legislative subgroups ought not be
elevated over the text approved by Congress as a whole").
34. Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 568 (quoting Patricia M. Wald, Some Observationson the Use
of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983)). It
should be noted that the Court did not comment "on whether these problems are sufficiently
prevalent to render legislative history inherently unreliable in all circumstances, a point on which
Members of this Court have disagreed." Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 568-69.
35. ESKRIDGE, supra note 27, at 26 (discussing purposivism as a method for interpreting
statutes); POPKiN, supra note 27, at 131-49; see generally HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS,
THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N.

Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey eds., The Foundation Press, Inc. 1994) (advocating the purposivist
approach to the interpretation of statutes).
36. Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 225, 227 (1999).
Justice Stephen Breyer, arguing for an "approach that places more emphasis on statutory purpose
and congressional intent," contends that judges "should pay primary attention to a statute's purpose
in difficult cases of interpretation in which language is not clear" and that "a purposive approach is
more consistent with the framework for a 'delegated democracy' that the Constitution creates."
STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 85 (Alfred
A. Knopf 2005).
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engaged in purposive interpretation since before there was a United
States. 37 An early and prominent illustration of judicial determination
of statutory purpose is found in Church of the Holy Trinity v. United
States.38 In that case the Court concluded that a contract prohibited by
the text of the relevant statute39 did not violate the law because "a thing
may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute,
because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers. 40
Although the statute prohibited the migration of aliens to the United
States to "perform labor or service of any kind," 4 1 the Court determined
that in passing the law Congress only sought "to stay the influx of...
cheap unskilled labor., 42 "It was never suggested that we had in this
country a surplus of brain toilers, and, least of all, that the market for the
services of Christian ministers was depressed by foreign competition. 43
Holy Trinity thus serves as an exemplar of the way in which courtdetermined purpose can override and, in effect, nullify an explicit textual
legislative mandate.44
The purposivist approach assumes that a jurist can and should
determine a statute's pertinent purpose. Where the legislature has
explicitly codified a law's purpose, this purpose-determination may be
easily found and bounded by the lawmaking body's declaration of the
statute's goals.45 But where a statute does not identify the purpose of the

37. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK, supra note 21, at 215.
38. 143 U.S. 457 (1891). The Holy Trinity Church entered into a contract with a minister, E.
Walpole Warren, who was "an alien residing in England," and Warren "was to remove to the city of
New York, and enter into its services as rector and pastor; and, in pursuance of such contract,
Warren did so remove and enter upon such service." Id. at 457-58.
39. The Alien Contract Labor Act of 1885 outlawed contracts with aliens who would migrate
to the United States to "perform labor or service of any kind in the United States, its Territories, or
the District of Columbia." Alien Contract Labor Act, ch. 164, § 1, 23 Stat. 332 (repealed 1952).
The Court opined, "It must be conceded that the act of the corporation is within the letter of this
section, for the relation of rector to his church is one of service, and implies labor on the one side
with compensation on the other." Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 458.
40. Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 459.
41. Alien Contract Labor Act § 1, 23 Stat. at 332.
42. Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 465.
43. Id. at 464.
44. See also United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979) (noting that an
argument resting on "a literal interpretation" of certain antidiscrimination provisions of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was "not without force" in plaintiffs challenge to a race-conscious
affirmative action plan). In this case, the Court looked to "Congress' primary concern in enacting"
the statute and "the goals of the Civil Rights Act-the integration of blacks into the mainstream of
American society... Id. at 202; United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543
(1940) (stating that "when the plain meaning" of the words of a statute produce results 'plainly at
variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole' this Court has followed that purpose, rather
than the literal words" (quoting Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 194 (1922))).
45. See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006) (example of
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law, or has or may have more than one stated purpose,4 6 the assumption
that a judge can authoritatively determine the law's relevant and
operative purpose or purposes is a problematic proposition. In the
contexts noted in the preceding sentence, judicially-determined purpose
may effectuate a purpose not contemplated or desired by the legislature,
thereby undoing compromises made and agreements reached by
legislators in their votes to enact law.4 7 Given these concerns and
realities, interest groups and others unable to convince a legislative
majority of the correctness of their positions may instead look to the
judiciary for the very benefits and desired policy outcomes they did not
obtain from the legislature.4 8
C. Textualism
Under another and currently prominent interpretive approach
championed by Justice Antonin Scalia and others, "[t]he text is the law,
and it is the text that must be observed. ' ' 49 Textualism posits that "the
authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the legislative history or
any other extrinsic material," 50 and that "it is ultimately the provisions of
a federal statute containing declarations of statutory purpose); National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 151 (2006) (declaring Congressional findings and policy reasons for the statute).
46. "Statutes are seldom crafted to pursue a single goal, and compromises necessary to ther
enactment may require adopting means other than those that would most effectively pursue the main
goal." Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 286 (1994); see generally Exxon Corp. v. Hunt,
475 U.S. 355 (1986) (noting the competing purposes of the federal Comprehensive Environmental
Response Compensation and Liability Act).
47. See Manning, Federalism,supra note 7 at 2016 ("[R]eliance on purpose threatens to upset
necessary legislative compromises because it arbitrarily shifts the level of generality at which the
lawmakers have expressed their policy.").
48. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 276-77 (1990).
49. Scalia, supra note 27, at 22; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in
Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59, 59 (1988) (explaining that the Supreme
Court has created a formula for statutory construction which always begins with examining the
language of the statute); John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106
COLUM. L. REv. 70, 73 (2006) ("'[N]ew textualism' ... requires judges to treat the clear import of
an enacted text as conclusive ....");John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L.
REv. 419, 420 (2005) ("[T]extualism ... in practice is associated with the basic proposition that
judges must seek and abide by the public meaning of the enacted text .... ); John F. Manning,
Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2001) (."[T]extualists,' . ..
give precedence to semantic context; judges must enforce the conventional meaning of a clear text,
even if it does not appear to make perfect sense of the statute's overall policy.").
50. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapatah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005). Interestingly,
textualist judges have resorted to and relied upon extrinsic and extra-textual sources when
considering and deciding textual meaning and signification, including dictionaries, case law, related
statutory provisions, clear statement rules, and canons of construction. See ESKRIDGE, supra note
27, at 42. On clear statement rules, see Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991); see
generally Manning, Federalism, supra note 17, at 2025-29 (stating that clear statement rules

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol27/iss1/2

10

Turner: On the Authority of the Two-Member NLRB: Statutory Interpretation

2009]

TWO-MEMBER NLRB

our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which
we are governed.",51 These propositions are consistent with the
textualist's premises "that legislatures have authority only to pass
statutes, not to form abstract 'intentions,' 5 2 and that judicial
interpretation, construction, and application are limited to and by the
plain meaning of the statutory text: "that is, given the ordinary meanings
of words and accepted precepts of grammar and syntax, what does the
provision signify to the reasonable person?, 53 Plain meaning analysis
calls for the interpretation of statutes "literally, that is, according to the
'plain meaning' of their words, without recourse to considerations of
legislative history, real-world context or consequences, or other indicia
of legislative purpose.' 5 4 Consider, for example, Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections v. Yeskey, 5 5 wherein the Supreme Court held
that the "plain text"5 6 of the statutory definition of "public entity" in
Title

II

of

the

Americans

with

Disabilities

"unambiguously extends to state prison inmates.,

Act

of

199057

58

Of course, the "plain" and "ordinary" meaning of text may be (in
litigation, will be) contestable and contested. "[F]or any statute of
consequence, the legislative drafting process ensures textual ambiguities,
which only multiply over time."' 59 That language may be ambiguous and
words may have more than one meaning is not a novel insight. 60 As
Chief Justice John Marshall observed in McCulloch v. Maryland61 :

presume "that absent a plain statement of legislative intent, Acts of Congress cannot intrude upon
the usual balance of state and federal power."). On canons of construction, see generally CROSS,
supra note 27, at 85-101; James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the
Elusive Questfor Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2005); Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on
the Theory ofAppellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes are to be Construed,
3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950).
51. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
52. Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 83 (2000).
53.
54.

ESKRIDGE, supra note 27, at 38.
POSNER, How JUDGES THINK, supra note 21, at 191.

55. 524 U.S. 206 (1998).
56. Id. at 213.
57. See42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(B).
58. Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 213. Title II prohibits discrimination by "a public entity" against
qualified individuals with a disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The Court reasoned that "[s]tate
prisons fall squarely within the statutory definition of 'public entity,' which includes 'any
department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local
government."' Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 210 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(B)).
59. ESKRIDGE, supra note 28, at 38.
60. "The flaw in plain meaning is, of course, the notion of a latent ambiguity." Peter Linzer,
The Comfort of Certainty:Plain Meaning and the ParolEvidence Rule, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 799,
803 (2002).
61. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
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Such is the character of human language, that no word conveys to the
mind, in all situations, one single definite idea; and nothing is more
common than to use a word in a figurative sense. Almost all
compositions contain words, which, taken in their rigorous sense,
would convey
a meaning different from that which is obviously
62
intended.

Plain meaning analysis is thus subject to the critique that, because
"English as a language lacks precision," it "possesses a chameleonic
quality that spans the color spectrum., 63 And a reader of a statute may
have to make a temporal interpretive choice: whether the plain and
ordinary meaning of the text is fixed at the time of legislative adoption
and enactment, or if the focus should instead be "concerned with how a
contemporary reader would understand 64the language employed, in
relation also to the law of the current day?,
D. Deference to AdministrativeAgencies
When, and under what circumstances, should courts defer to the

rulings, determinations and statutory interpretations of administrative
agencies?
Under one approach, known as Skidmore deference, an agency's
views concerning statutory meaning "constitute a body of experience
and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort
for guidance. 65 The weight given to the agency's judgment by a court

62. Id. at 414.
63. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL
MODEL 54 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2002). "Virtually all words have a multiplicity of meanings, as
the most nodding acquaintance with a dictionary will attest." Id.
64. Strauss, supranote 36, at 228.
65. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). For discussions of Skidmore
deference, see generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretationsfrom Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO.
L.J. 1083, 1109-10 (2008); Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern
Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235 (2007); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why
Deference?: Implied Delegation, Agency Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54
ADMIN. L. REV. 735 (2002); Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference: Conceptualizing Skidmore Within
the ArchitectureofChevron, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1105 (2001). Skidmore deference is not the
same as and should be distinguished from Seminole Rock deference. In Bowles v. Seminole Rock &
Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945), the Supreme Court instructed courts to "look to the administrative
construction of the regulation if the meaning of the words used is in doubt .... [T]he ultimate
criterion is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation." Id. at 414. Under this approach, "an
agency's interpretation of its own regulations are conclusive and binding on the courts, so long as
the agency's interpretation is neither arbitrary nor capricious." Rebecca Hanner White, Deference
and Disability Discrimination,99 MICH. L. REV. 532, 541 (2000).
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"will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade,
if lacking power to control." 66
A separate and critically important deferential analysis was
announced by the Supreme Court in its 1984 decision in Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.6 7 Chevron instructed
that an administrative agency's power to administer a program created
by Congress "necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the
making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly ....
Where a statutory gap has explicitly been left by Congress "for the
agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to
elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation." 69 Where
Congressional delegation "is implicit rather than explicit ... a court may
not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision 70for a
reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.,
Judicial review of certain administrative agency constructions of a
statute is guided by and must be conducted in accordance with the wellknown Chevron two-step inquiry. 71 First, a court must ask, "whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed

66. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
67. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). It should be noted that in reviewing NLRB decisions, the Supreme
Court has sometimes cited, not Chevron, but Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482
U.S. 27 (1987). For example, in Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359 (1998),
the Court, citing Fall River, stated that "[c]ourts must defer to the requirements imposed by the
Board if they are 'rational and consistent with the Act' and if the Board's 'explication is not
inadequate, irrational or arbitrary."' Id. at 364 (citations omitted); see also NLRB v. City Disposal
Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 829 (1984) (citing NLRB v. Iron Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 350 (1978), when
holding that "on an issue that implicates its expertise in labor relations, a reasonable construction by
the Board is entitled to considerable deference").
68. 467 U.S. at 843 (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)).
69. Id. at 843-44; see also ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317, 324 (1994)
express delegation, the Board's views merit the greatest
("Because this case involves ...
deference.").
70. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
71. See id. at 842-43. However, Cass Sunstein has posited a three-step inquiry that he refers
to as the "Chevron Step Zero," an "initial inquiry into whether the Chevron framework applies at
all." Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191 (2006); see also Richard W.
Murphy, A "New" Counter-Marbury: Reconciling Skidmore Deference and Agency Interpretive
Freedom, 56 ADMN. L. REv. 1, 18 (2004) (naming the "threshold inquiry regarding" whether
Chevron or Skidmore "applies Chevron's 'step zero"') (citation omitted). For the argument that the
Chevron two-step framework is properly understood as having only one step, see generally
Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REv. 597
(2009).
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intent of Congress. 72 If this initial inquiry is answered in the negative, a
court, going to the second step of the analysis:
[D]oes not simply impose its own construction of the statute, as would
be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather,
if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,
answer is based on a
the question for the court is whether the
73 agency's
permissible construction of the statute.

Chevron's deference regime was discussed in United States v.
Mead Corp. 74 wherein the Court held:
[T[hat administrative implementation of a particular statutory
provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that
Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules
carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming
deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.
Delegation of such authority may be shown in a variety of ways, as by
an agency's power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment
or by some other indication of a comparable congressional
rulemaking,
75
intent.

The Court further opined:
[W]hether or not they enjoy any express delegation of authority on a
particular question, agencies charged with applying a statute

72. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43; see also Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S. Ct.
1498, 1505 n.4 (2009) (stating that "if Congress has directly spoken to an issue then any agency
interpretation contradicting what Congress has said would be unreasonable"); Lechmere, Inc. v.
NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 537 (1992) (concluding, "in Chevron terms, that § 7 [of the NLRA] speaks to
the issue of nonemployee access to an employer's property" and refusing to defer to the Board's
interpretation of the Act's definition of "employee"). Note the Chevron Court's reference to
Congressional "intent." In a subsequent decision, the Court referred, not to intent, but to "the plain
language of the statute." See Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407,
417 (1991). "This reformulation is obviously designed to make step one of the Chevron doctrine a
purely textualist inquiry. No consideration of legislative history or of the 'intent' of Congress is
mentioned. 'Plain language' ... and 'the text' are all that count." Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism
and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 358 (1994).
73. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (footnote omitted); see also Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243,
255 (2005) ("An interpretation of an ambiguous statute may also receive substantial deference.");
NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 712-13 (2001) (citing Chevron and concluding
that certain aspects of the Board's interpretation of section 2(11) of the Act "are reasonable, and
hence controlling on this Court"); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 457-58 (1996) (holding that the
Secretary of Labor's approach to determination of employee exemption from overtime payment
requirements was sustained as a permissible construction of Fair Labor Standards Act).
74. 533 U.S. 218 (2000).
75. Id. at 226-27.
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necessarily make all sorts of interpretive choices, and while not all of
those choices bind judges to follow them, they certainly may influence
courts facing questions the agencies have already answered ....
The
fair measure of deference to an agency administering its own statute
has been understood to vary with circumstances, and courts have
looked to the degree of the agency's care, its consistency, formality,
and relative expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the agency's
position. The approach has produced a spectrum of judicial responses,
from great respect at one end, to near indifference at the other.
In the view of the Mead Court, Chevron deference is warranted
where Congress has expressly authorized an agency "to engage in the
process of rule-making or adjudication that produces regulations or
rulings for which deference is claimed.",77 The absence of such formal
agency procedures and processes "does not alone ... bar the application
of Chevron" as the Court has "sometimes found reasons for Chevron
deference even when no such administrative formality was required and
none was afforded ....

As "no provision [of the Constitution] sets out explicit instructions
to judges about the limits of interpretive flexibility or about what other

sources or considerations are admissible or relevant to help interpret the
text,' 79 no one single statutory interpretation approach is mandated.
Accordingly,

"a judge

may embrace

all the available

tools as

theoretically legitimate and selectively employ those that are best suited
for the particular case."'s

With this point and the foregoing discussion

76. 1d. at 227-28 (footnotes and citations omitted).
77. Id. at 229.
78. Id. at 231; see also Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n. v. Brand X Internet Sen's., 545 U.S.
967, 981 (2004) (holding that Chevron applies to cases involving an agency's inconsistent
interpretations of the statute it administers, and opining that "the whole point of Chevron is to leave
the discretion provided by the ambiguities of a statute with the implementing agency." (quoting
Smiley v. Citibank (S. D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996)).
79. VERMEULE, supra note 23, at 31.
80. CROSS, supra note 27, at 17; see also id. at 46 ("A judge could, in his or her judgment,
rely on statutory text in one case, legislative history in the next, and perhaps rely on some broad
invocation of legislative purpose or pragmatic consideration in the following decision."). Reliance
on several interpretive methodologies can even be found in one case. For example, in NLRB v.
Town & Country Electric, Inc.,'516 U.S. 85 (1995), the Supreme Court addressed the question
(answered in the affirmative by the NLRB) whether an individual simultaneously employed by an
employer and by a labor union can be an "employee" under section 2(3) of the Act and therefore
protected by the NLRA. Section 2(3) of the Act provides that the "term 'employee' shall include
any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless this
subchapter explicitly states otherwise ....
" 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006). A unanimous Court
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of interpretative methodologies in mind, the discussion now turns to the
specific subject of this essay: the debate over section 3(b) and the
decisionmaking authority of the two-member NLRB.
III. THE (WHICH) QUORUM: Two OR THREE?

In 1935 the United States Congress passed and President Franklin
D. Roosevelt signed into law the NLRA. As enacted, the Act created the
NLRB, an administrative agency empowered to administer and enforce
the Act's unfair labor practice and representation election provisions. s
The Board was initially composed of three members appointed to
staggered five-year terms by the President with the advice and consent
of the United
States Senate,8 2 with two of those members constituting a
83
quorum.
Twelve years later, in the Taft-Hartley Act, 84 Congress overrode the

holding that the individual was a statutory employee cited Chevron, noting that "the Board often
possesses a degree of legal leeway when it interprets its governing statute." Town & Country, 516
U.S. at 89-90. Referencing ordinary and legal dictionary definitions of the word "employee," the
Court concluded that the Board's position "is consistent with the broad language of the [statute]
itself;" that the agency's "broad, literal interpretation of the word 'employee' is consistent with
several of the Act's purposes;" that legislative history sources were "consistent with the Board's
broad interpretations of the word;" that the Board's reading was consistent with Court precedent;
and that another "provision of the 1947 Labor Management Relations Act seems specifically to
contemplate the possibility that a company's employee might also work for a union." Id. at 90-92;
see also id. at 92-96 (rejecting the employer's argument for an interpretation of "employee" under
common-law agency principles and deferring to the Board's construction of the term). For
additional discussion of Town & Country, see generally Ronald Turner, Reactions of the Regulated,
17 LAB. LAW. 479 (2002).
81. See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2006) (the Act's prohibition of unfair labor practices); id. § 159(a)
("Representatives designated or selected ... by the majority of the employees" in a bargaining unit
"shall be the exclusive bargaining representative of all the employees in [the] unit for the purposes
of collective bargaining ....");id. § 159(c) (provision governing NLRB processing of election
petitions, secret ballot elections, and certification of election results); see also ROBERT A. GORMAN
& MATTHEW W. FINKIN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING 9 (2d ed. 2004) ("Congress in 1935 created an administrative agency, the National
Labor Relations Board, to implement both the unfair labor practice provisions . . .and the
representation provisions... of the Labor Act.").
82. See National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 3(a), 49 Stat. 449, 451 (1935) ("There is
hereby created a board ...which shall be composed of three members...") (codified as amended at
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.); FRANK W. MCCULLOCH & TIM BORNSTEIN, THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 23 (1974).
83. See National Labor Relations Act § 3(b), 49 Stat. at 451 (1935) ("A vacancy in the Board
shall not impair the right of the remaining members to exercise all of the powers of the Board, and
two members of the Board shall, at all times, constitute a quorum.").
84. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120 61 Stat. 136 (1947)
(codified as amended at scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.); see also Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C.
Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Exile: Problems With Its Structure and Function and
Suggestions for Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 2013, 2033 (2009) ("The NLRA is an amalgam of two
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veto of President Harry S. Truman and amended the NLRA. 85 The
statutory changes and additions8 6 included an expansion of the Board's
membership from three to five members 87 and, in section 3(b), the
following delegation, vacancy, and quorum provisions:
The Board is authorized to delegate to any group of three or more
members any or all of the powers which it may itself exercise .... A

vacancy in the Board shall not impair the right of the remaining
members to exercise all of the powers of the Board, and three members
of the Board shall, at all times, constitute a quorum of the Board,
except that two members shall constitute a quorum of any group
designated pursuant to the first sentence hereof....88
Does section 3(b) mandate that the Board must, at all times, have at
least three active members? Has the Board lacked a quorum beginning
89
on January 1, 2008, when its active membership fell to two members?
A. Two

1. The First Circuit's View
In Northeastern Land Services, Ltd. v. NLRB, 90 the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit considered and rejected the
employer's argument that then-Member Liebman's and Member
Schaumber's determination that certain conduct by the company violated
the Act "could not be properly issued because the Board lacked a
quorum under section 3 of the NLRA." 91

statutes, the Wagner Act (1935) and the Taft-Hartley Act (1947).").
85. See 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACT 40 (John E. Higgins, Jr., etal. eds., 5th ed. 2006).

86. See generally id. at 41-47 (discussing the shifted emphasis of federal labor law as a result
of amendments to the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947).
87.

See 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1935); Ronald Turner, Ideological Voting on the National Labor

Relations Board, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 707, 714 (2006) ("As a matter of custom, and not law,
no more than three of the five NLRB members may belong to the President's political party."); see
also James J. Brudney, Isolated and Politicized: The NLRB 's Uncertain Future,26 COMP. LAB. L.

& POL'Y J. 221, 244 n.109 (2005) (noting that a "tradition has developed of appointing both
Democrats and Republicans to the Board, with the President's party holding a three-to-two majority
of the seats and also the chair") (citation omitted).
88. 29 U.S.C. § 153(b).
89. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
90. 560 F.3d 36(lst Cir. 2009).
91. Id. at 40. The challenged Board decision concluded that the employer's maintenance and
discharge of an employee for violating an overly broad confidentiality provision was unlawful, and
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Pointing out that the issue was one of first impression 92 and
concluding that the court "owe[d] some deference to the agency's
view," 93 the First Circuit stated that the Board's December 2007
"delegation of its institutional power to a panel that ultimately consisted
of a two-member quorum because of a vacancy was lawful under the
plain text of section 3(b)."94 Accordingly, the court concluded, "[t]he
vacancy, which left the two-member quorum remaining, may not, under
the terms of section 3(b), impair the right of the two-member quorum to
exercise all powers of the Board., 95 The First Circuit noted that its
position was consistent with the conclusions reached by the OLC in
200396 and by the Ninth Circuit in its 1982 decision in Photo-Sonics,
Inc. v. NLRB. 97
ordered the employee's reinstatement and other remedial measures. See Ne. Land Servs., Ltd., 352
N.L.R.B. 744, 746 (2008). Interestingly, in a footnote in the Board's opinion, Member Schaumber
questions the theory that an employer's imposition of discipline pursuant to an unlawfully
overbroad rule is necessarily unlawful, such as in situations where the discipline imposed is for a
lawful reason albeit under an overly broad, unlawful rule. Nonetheless, [Schaumber] applies
precedent for institutional reasons for the purpose of deciding this case. Id. at 746 n.9. This
footnote reveals one way in which a litigant can be disadvantaged by a two-member Board decision:
the inability to convince a majority of a three-member panel of the correctness of its position. The
difference between Liebman and Schaumber on the question of whether an overly broad rule is
necessarily illegal did not result in a "tie" between the two members because Schaumber openly
added to his decisional calculus and acted on institutional concerns in casting his ultimate vote. For
additional cases in which Member Schaumber applied and adhered to Board precedent for
institutional reasons, see generally Fremont-Rideout Health Group, 354 N.L.R.B. No. 68 (Aug. 27,
2009); Brighton Retail, Inc., 354 N.L.R.B. No. 62 (July 31, 2009); Superior Prot., Inc., 354
N.L.R.B. No. 12 (Apr. 30, 2009).
92. Ne. Land Servs., Ltd., 560 F.3d at 37.
93. Id. at 40 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 838
(1984)).
94. Id. at 41.
95. Id.
96. In a 2003 legal opinion, the OLC responded to an inquiry from the Board regarding the
agency's authority to issue decisions and orders in unfair labor practice and representation cases
"once three of the five seats on the Board have become vacant." Quorum Requirements, supra note
5, at 1.The OLC construed and applied the "plain terms" of section 3(b) and determined that "if the
Board delegated all of its powers to a group of three members, that group could continue to issue
decisions and orders so long as a quorum of two members remained." Id. at 2. Section 3(b)'s
"provision for a two-member quorum" of the delegated group of three "is an express exception to
I...
Id. In reaching this
the requirement that a quorum of the Board shall be three members .
conclusion the OLC recognized that "the Board would be creating a three-member 'group' with the
intent that it operate as a two-member group upon the departure of the third member," and that "the
Board itself would lack its quorum of three members, and the proposed arrangement would be
designed with the purpose of dealing with that situation." Id. at 4. That intent and arrangement did
not violate section 3(b), the OLC reasoned: that provision "imposes no requirement that the group
continue to have three members, as long as the two-member quorum continues." Id.
97. 678 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1982). Photo-Sonics rejected the employer's contention that an
NLRB unfair labor practice decision was invalid because one member of the three-member panel
resigned effective the same day as and before the issuance of the Board's ruling. Id. at 122. As all
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2. The Seventh Circuit's Approach
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
considered the section 3(b) quorum issue in New Process Steel, L.P. v.
NLRB. 98 Contending that a Board decision and order should not be
enforced, the employer argued that the Board's December 2007
delegation99 to a three-member group was improper because the "third
member, whose term was about to expire, was ... a phantom member
who would not actually consider cases before the Board."' 00 That action
violated the plain meaning of section 3(b), the employer urged, because
the delegation was to two and not to three members of the agency. The
Board countered that section 3(b) "is clear that the vacancy of one
member of a three-member panel does not impede the right of the
remaining two members to execute the full delegated powers of the
NLRB."''

The Seventh Circuit agreed with the Board:
As we read it, § 3(b) accomplished two things: first, it gave the Board
the power to delegate its authority to a group of three members, and
second, it allowed the Board to continue to conduct business with a
quorum of three members but expressly provides that two members of
the Board constitutes a quorum where the Board has delegated its
of the
authority to a group of three members.
, • The plain meaning
102
statute thus supports the NLRB's delegation procedure.
In support of this reading, the court relied on the First Circuit's
Northeastern Land Services and the Ninth Circuit's Photo-Sonics

three Board members concurred in the decision, the court concluded that "we need not determine
whether [the member's] resignation precluded his participation in the Board's decision." Id.
Moreover, the court opined, the Board's decision would be valid even if the member who resigned
had not participated in the ruling. Id. Quoting section 3(b) and looking to analogous "quorum"
practices in the federal courts of appeals, the court concluded that "'quorum' means the number of
members that may legally transact business ... ." Id. at 123. Because two of the three members of
the Board's panel supported the ruling, the member's resignation "did not invalidate the decision."
Id.; see also Ne. Land Sers., Ltd., 560 F.3d at 42 (noting and citing court decisions upholding
analogous quorum rules and approaches by other administrative agencies).
98. 564 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2009), enforcing 353 N.L.R.B. No. 13 (Sep. 25, 2008). The
employer sought judicial review of the Board's determination that the employer violated the Act by
unlawfully repudiating a collective bargaining agreement the company had negotiated with its
employees' union representative and by illegally withdrawing recognition from the union during the
term of a valid labor agreement. See id. at 842.
99. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
100. New ProcessSteel, 564 F.3d at 845.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 845-46 (emphasis added and footnote omitted).
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decisions. 103
Having decided the quorum issue on the ground of (its
understanding of) the plain meaning of section 3(b),' °4 the Seventh
Circuit remarked that the legislative history of section 3(b) did not
support the employer's reading of that provision. 105 The "primary
concern" of the framers of the Taft-Hartley Act in expanding the
Board's membership from three to five members "was increasing the
efficiency of the Board ....
The purpose of the revisions, then, was to
allow the NLRB to hear more cases by creating panels of the entire
Board."' 1 6 The Seventh Circuit found "no suggestion in the relevant
reports that the Board is restricted from acting when its membership falls
below a certain level .... Indeed, a court interpreting the statute that
way would hinder the efficient panel operation that Congress intended to

103. See id. at 846; supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text. The Seventh Circuit rejected
the employer's attempt to distinguish Photo-Sonics. In Photo-Sonics, the employer averred, three
Board members participated in the at-issue decision, "while in this case the decision was made by a
panel of two." New Process Steel, 564 F.3d at 846. "By its terms," the Seventh Circuit reasoned,
"§ 3(b) contains no requirement about whether a vacant Board member needs to have heard
evidence or participated in the decision in order for the quorum requirement to apply. As long as
the panel consisted of three NLRB members at the time it was constituted, Photo-Sonics is
persuasive authority endorsing the NLRB's reading of the statute." Id.
104. The court noted that the consideration of a statute's legislative history or analogous cases
is not necessary when the "plain meaning of a statute is unambiguous." Id. (citing United States v.
Easter, 553 F.3d 519, 526 (7th Cir. 2009) ("Where, as here, the plain meaning of the statute is
unambiguous, that is the end of the matter.")).
105. Id. at 846-47.
106. Id. at 847. The Taft-Hartley Act's increase in the Board's membership from three to five
was a compromise between the three-member Board proposed in the House bill, H.R. 3020, and the
seven-member Board sought in S. 1126. See H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (Apr. 10, 1947),
reprinted in

I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947

[hereinafter LEG. HIST.], at 3; S. 1126, 80th Cong, 1st Sess. (Apr. 17, 1947), 1 LEG. HIST. at 106. A
report by the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare stated that the three-member Board
was "from 12 to 18 months behind in its docket .... Much of this delay stems from the fact that the
three Board members are so overburdened with the duty of deciding contested cases that they have
little or no time to give to problems of internal administration." REP. NO 105 ON S. 1126 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. (Apr. 17, 1947); 1 LEG. HIST. at 414. An expansion of the Board from three to
seven members "would permit it to operate in panels of three, thereby increasing by 100 percent its
ability to dispose of cases expeditiously." Id.; see also 93 CONG. REC. 1911 (Mar. 10, 1947)
(remarks of Sen. Wayne L. Morse), 2 LEG. HIST. at 984 (increasing the Board's membership from
three to seven members would "empower the Board to act in sections of not less than three
members"); 93 CONG. REc. 3837 (Apr. 23, 1947) (remarks of Sen. Howard Taft), 2 LEG. HIST. at
1011 ("[W]e have increased the number of the members of the Board from 3 to 7, in order that they
may sit in two panels, with 3 members on each panel, and accordingly may accomplish twice as
much in the way of the number of hearings held."). The Senate bill also provided that "four
members of the Board shall, at all times, constitute a quorum." S.1126, 1 LEG. HIST. at 107. The
House and Senate conference committee agreed that the Board's membership would be increased to
five with three members constituting a quorum. See H. CONF. REP. NO. 510, ON H.R. 3020, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. (June 3, 1947), 1 LEG. HIST. at 509, 541.
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create." 10 7 The employer needed, but did not produce, statements in the
legislative history "establishing that the Board was forbidden from
operating with a quorum of two, or that Congress was particularly
concerned about delegating authority to Board members whose term was
about to expire."10 8 With this posited efficiency-promoting legislative
intent animating its analysis, the court concluded that "[f]orbidding the
NLRB to sit with a quorum of two when there are two or more vacancies
on the
Board would thus frustrate the purposes of the act, not further
9
10

it.

The Seventh Circuit then considered and rejected the employer's
argument that the Supreme Court had invalidated similar quorum
procedures in Nguyen v. United States.1 0 Nguyen was distinguishable in
two respects, the Seventh Circuit reasoned. First, the statute interpreted
in that case, 28 U.S.C. section 46,111 "contains no delegation or quorum
12
clauses, simply a requirement that panels consist of three judges."'
Second, Nguyen, examining the legislative history of section 46, found
that Congress was concerned about the routine assignment of cases to

107. New ProcessSteel, 564 F.3d at 847.
108. Id. Interestingly, Senator Joseph C. O'Mahoney, arguing in favor of sustaining President
Truman's veto of the Taft-Hartley Act, expressed his concem that giving the Board the authority to
delegate its power to three members would allow "any two members of that group of three [to]
speak for the Board. So we have a bill . . . which not only authorizes the Board to delegate its
power, but authorizes the Board to delegate its powers, and all of them, to less than a quorum of the
Board." 93 CONG. REC. 7525 (June 23, 1947) (remarks of Sen. O'Mahoney), 2 LEG. HIST. at 1632.
Thus, at least one legislator was concerned that the power of the NLRB could be delegated to and
exercised by two and only two Board members.
109. New Process Steel, 564 F.3d at 847.
110. 539 U.S. 69 (2003). The Nguyen Court, by a vote of 5-4, held that a three-member Ninth
Circuit panel consisting of two life-tenured Article Ill judges and one Article IV judge who was
appointed to a ten-year term did not have the authority to decide an appeal. Id. 28 U.S.C. § 46(b)
mandates "the hearing and determination of cases and controversies by separate panels, each
consisting of three judges." 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) (2006). Section 46(d) provides that a "majority of
the number ofjudges authorized to constitute a court or panel thereof... shall constitute a quorum."
Id. § 46(d). The Court stated that it is "true that two judges of a three-judge panel constitute a
quorum legally able to transact business," and that "settled law permits a quorum to proceed to
judgment when one member of the panel dies or is disqualified." Nguyen, 539 U.S. at 82. In the
Court's view, section 46(b) required a panel of at least three Article Ill judges in the first instance as
"Congress apparently enacted § 46(b) in part 'to curtail the prior practice under which some circuits
were routinely assigning some cases to two-judge panels."' Id. at 83 (quoting Murray v. National
Broadcasting Co., 35 F.3d 45, 47 (2d Cir. 1994)). Given this apparent reason for the passage of the
statute, the Court concluded that "although the two Article Ill judges who took part in the decision
of petitioners' appeals would have constituted a quorum if the original panel had been properly
created, it is at least highly doubtful whether they had any authority to serve by themselves as a
panel." Id.
111. 28 U.S.C. § 46(2006).
112. New Process Steel, 564 F.3d at 848.
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two-judge panels.1 13 Section 3(b) of the Act "was not motivated by
quorum and delegation clauses
similar concerns, and indeed contains
' "14
here."
issue
at
scenario
the
cover
that
The Seventh Circuit also referred to Supreme Court and District of
Columbia Circuit rulings from which it gleaned the principle "that a
public board has the authority to act despite vacancies because the board,
rather than the individual members, has the authority to act ...

so long

'5

That principle
as they have satisfied the quorum requirements.""
"suggests the NLRB has the authority to act so long as they have
satisfied the quorum requirements.""16
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit discussed the employer's reliance
on Assure Competitive Transportation,Inc. v. United States." 7 In that
case, vacancies on the Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC" or
"Commission") had reduced the number of members from the full
complement of eleven to six. The ICC requested and Congress passed
an amendment giving the Commission the authority to act with a
quorum of active commissioners when addressing certain matters."'
"Because the amendment was intended to establish the Commission's
ability to act with only six members in office," the Assure court found
that it was "clear that Congress used the language 'a majority of the
Commission' to mean a majority of the existing Commission.""' 9 The
employer in New Process Steel argued that, unlike the ICC, the NLRB
did not seek Congressional permission to act with a quorum of the two
The Seventh Circuit responded that the
remaining members. 120
that the Board was not acting within its
presumed
employer's argument
12
"Given that the plain meaning of the statute
statutory authority.
New Process Steel's
supports NLRB's reading of the statute,
22
interpretation of Assure is unpersuasive.' '

113.
114.

See id.; Nguyen, 539 U.S. at 83.
New ProcessSteel, 564 F.3d at 848.

115. Id.; see, e.g., FTC v. Flotill Prods., Inc., 389 U.S. 179 (1967); see also Falcon Trading
Group, Ltd. v. SEC, 102 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Railroad Yardmasters of Am. v. Harris, 721
F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
116.
117.
118.

New Process Steel, 564 F.3d at 848.
629 F.2d 467 (7th Cir. 1980); see also New Process Steel, 564 F.3d at 848.
See Assure, 629 F.2d at 474 (discussing amendment of 49 U.S.C. § 10327).

119.

Id.

120.
121.
122.

New Process Steel, 546 F.3d at 848.
Id.
Id.
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3. The Fourth Circuit's Reading
Narricot Industries, L.P. v. NLRB 123 examined and denied an
employer's petition for review of the two-member Board's decision and
holding that the company engaged in certain conduct violative of
sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. 124 Before addressing the merits of
the Board's decision, the court asked whether
that decision "was
1' 25
properly issued by a two-member quorum."
Focusing on the text of section 3(b), the court opined that three
provisions of that section-the delegation, vacancy, and quorum
clauses-were pertinent. The Board delegated all of its powers to a
three-member group in December 2007. Upon the expiration of the term
of one of those three members,1 26 "the remaining two members
constituted a quorum of the three-member group, empowered to act with
all of the Board's powers in light of the 'vacancy' and 'quorum'
provisions."' 127 Thus, the court reasoned, "[u]nder the plain and
unambiguous text of § 3(b) ... the designated three-member
group was
28
quorum."'
two-member
a
with
act
to
empowered
The court thus disagreed with and rejected the view that section
3(b) contains two separate and distinct quorum requirements, one for the
Board and another for a delegee three-member group.' 29 While section
3(b) provides that the three-member quorum requirement for the Board
applies "at all times,"' 130 the court noted the section's modifying phrase

123. 587 F.3d 654 (4th Cir. 2009).
124. Adopting and affirming an administrative law judge's ruling, the Board determined that
the employer unlawfully withdrew recognition from the union representative and illegally solicited

employee resignations of union membership and revocation of their dues checkoff authorizations.
See Narricot Industries, L.P., 353 N.L.R.B. No. 82 (Jan. 2009).
125. NarricotIndustries, 587 F.3d at 658.
126. The employer argued that the Board's ability to transact business automatically ended
with the expiration of Member Kirsanow's term. See id., 587 F.3d at 660. Rejecting that
argument, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the employer's theory "would turn the two-member

quorum provision on its head. If the loss of one member of a three-member group automatically
caused the group to cease to exist, then a two-member quorum would never suffice." Id. And, the
court continued, the employer's argument was inconsistent with the vacancy provision of section
3(b), "which specifies that a 'vacancy in the Board'-or, necessarily, a three-member group acting
with the full powers of the Board-'shall not impair the right of the remaining members to exercise
all of the powers of the Board."' Id.
127. Id.at 659.
128. Id. (noting the same conclusion reached by the Seventh Circuit in New Process Steel and
the First Circuit in Northeastern Land Services and the Justice Department's OLC).

129. The District of Columbia Circuit read section 3(b) as creating separate quorum
requirements. See Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 469, 472-73
(D.C. Cir. 2009).
130.

29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (2006).
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"except that two members shall constitute a quorum of any" delegee
three-member group. 13 1 The phrase "'except that' ordinarily introduces
an exception."' 32 Congress would have omitted the words "except that"
if the legislature sought to put in place two separate and independent
quorum clauses, the court reasoned. As Congress included those words
in section 3(b), two of the three members of a delegee group are
decide cases even though three of the Board's
empowered to and can
33
five seats are vacant.'
4. The Second Circuit Speaks
In Snell Island SNF LLC v. NLRB, 134 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed the question whether the twomember Board panel was without statutory authority to issue a decision
and order concluding that the employer had unlawfully refused to
negotiate with the union representative of its employees.' 35 The court
recounted the circumstances surrounding the Board's December 2007
delegation of powers to a three-member panel. 136 The employer
conceded that a duly constituted three-member Board panel could
continue with a quorum of two if one of the panel members was no
longer available. But no three-member panel was effectively constituted
in December 2007, the employer argued, as "there was never any intent
that the three-member group consisting of Liebman, Schaumber, and
Kirsanow would actually issue decisions and orders.' 3 7 Because the
Board knew that Member Kirsanow "would not be around to exercise
the powers being delegated," the
employer asserted that the delegation
38
was "an acknowledged sham."'
Considering, first, the employer's "sham" argument, the Second
Circuit examined the text of section 3(b). Agreeing with the conclusion
reached by the First Circuit in Northeastern Land Services, the Second
Circuit found that section 3(b) expressly authorized the Board to
delegate any or all of its powers to three or more members; thus, "the
delegation to a panel plenipotentiary was within the NLRB's

131.

Id.

132. Narricot Industries, 587 F.3d at 660.
133. See id.
134. 568 F.3d 410 (2d Cir. 2009).
135. See 352 N.L.R.B. No. 106 (July 18, 2008), petition for review denied and cross-petition
for enforcement granted, 568 F.3d 410 (2d Cir. 2009).
136. See Snell Island, at 412.
137. Id. at 415 (quoting employer's brief, brackets omitted).
138. Id.
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authority."13 9

That delegation, done with knowledge of a member's

imminent departure, did not call for a different reading of section 3(b),
the court opined. 140 "That the NLRB knew that the membership of the
panel would soon be reduced from three to two-and that the Board's
on the fact that
membership would also decrease to two-has no bearing
41
instance.'
first
the
in
constituted
lawfully
was
the panel
The court then turned to what it viewed as the "more difficult
question [of] whether the NLRB panel lost its authority once the NLRB
as a whole lost its quorum." 142 In considering this issue the Second
Circuit engaged in a Chevron deferential standard of judicial review.
Asking the step one query-"whether Congress has directly spoken to
the precise question at issue" 143-the court noted that two circuit courts
of appeals examining the quorum issue did not agree on the "plain
meaning" of section 3(b). 144 For the Second Circuit, this circuit split
suggested statutory ambiguity with regard to the issue of 4a Board panel's
1
residual power when the Board no longer has a quorum.1
Still at Chevron step one, the Second Circuit concluded that section
3(b) was silent on the specific question of the authority of a duly
constituted Board panel once a quorum of the Board itself is lost, and
found no helpful canon of statutory construction shedding light on
Congress's intent.1 46 Turning to the legislative history of the Taft-

Hartley Act, the court opined that Congress added section 3(b) "to
' 47
enable the Board to handle an increasing caseload more efficiently."'
139. Id. at419.
140. Ne. Land Servs. v. NLRB, 560 F.3d 36, 41 (1st Cir. 2009).
141. Snelllsland,568 F.3dat419.
142. Id.
143. Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842
(1984)). Referring to the Second Circuit's approach to the Chevron two-step analysis set out in N.Y.
State Office of Children & Family Servs. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. Admin. for
Children & Families, 556 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2009), the court stated that ascertaining Congressional
intent at step one begins with the text of the statute and ends there if the statute is not ambiguous. If
the court determines that "Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue" the
court will look to canons of construction and legislative history "to see if those interpretive clues
permit us to identify Congress's clear intent." Id. at 97 (quoting Cohen v. JP Morgan Chase & Co.,
116 (2d Cir. 2007).
498 F.3d 111,
144. Snell Island, 568 F.3d at 419. Compare New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 840,
845 (7th Cir. 2009) ("As the NLRB delegated its full powers to a group of three Board members,
the two remaining Board members can proceed as a quorum despite the subsequent vacancy."), with
Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 469, 472 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
("Reading the two quorum provisions harmoniously, . . . a three-member Board may delegate its
powers to a three-member group, and this delegee group may act with two members so long as the
all times,' satisfied." (citations omitted)).
Board quorum requirement is, 'at
145. See Snell Island,568 F.3d at 420.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 421 (quoting Hall-Brooke Hosp. v. NLRB, 645 F.2d 158, 162 n.6 (2d Cir. 1981)).
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The court quoted from a Senate report which concluded that:
There is no field in which time is more important, yet the Board is
from 12 to 18 months behind in its docket ....The expansion of the
Board . . . would permit it to operate in panels of three, thereby

increasing by 100144ercent its ability to dispose of cases expeditiously
in the final stage.
Thus, "one of the purposes' 149
of the Taft-Hartley amendments was to
increase the Board's efficiency."
The court also considered the NLRB's argument that the pre-TaftHartley Board, with three members and a two-member quorum
requirement, decided hundreds of cases even though only two of the
three seats were filled. 150 "However, while this history seems to support
the Board's reading of the Act, it does not definitively answer the
precise question at issue in the instant case-whether, in the name of
efficiency, a panel of the Board may continue to operate once the Board
itself loses its quorum."1 51 While one senator did express his concern
that the Board could delegate all of its powers "to less than a quorum of
the Board,"1 52 the Second Circuit decided that "[w]ithout more, we are
unable to conclude that delegation to less than a quorum of the Board
was an intended
or unintended consequence of the Taft-Hartley
153
amendments."
Concluding that Congressional intent was not clear enough to end
the Chevron analysis at step one, the court proceeded to Chevron step
two. "The NLRB's interpretation of the Act is straightforward," the
148. Id. (quoting S.Rep. No. 80-105 at 8, reprintedin 1 LEG. HIST. 407, 414).
149. Id. at 423. This efficiency enhancing purpose was not the only purpose of the TaftHartley Act discerned by the court. See id. at 420 ("the broad animating purpose of the legislation
was to equalize the balance of power between employers and employees in response to the
widespread feeling that the unions had gotten too much power during the Roosevelt years"
(quotation marks and citation omitted)).
150. Id. at422.
In our view it is significant, in light of the established history of operating with only two
members, that Congress continued to allow only two Board members (a quorum of an
NLRB panel) to issue labor decisions. While increasing the size of the Board from three
members to five members, Congress left undisturbed the two-member quorum
requirement for panels of the Board.

Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. (quoting 93 CONG. REc. 7677, 7679 (June 23, 1947) (remarks of Sen. O'Mahoney), 2
LEG. HIST. 1724); see also supra note 108 and accompanying text. The court was "reluctant to
draw much significance from a lone remark by a single senator opposing a bill, made after the TaftHartley Act initially passed and only just before the Senate voted to override President Truman's
veto." Snell Island, 568 F.3d at 422.
153. Snell Island, 568 F.3d at 423.
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court opined. 5 4 Section 3(b) expressly allows the delegation of the
Board's power to a three-member panel and does not indicate that a
Board panel does or does not retain jurisdiction in the event the Board
itself loses a quorum.1 55 "In light of the animating purpose of the TaftHartley amendments ... to increase the Board's overall efficiency, the
NLRB interprets the Act as permitting the two remaining members of
the Board to issue labor decisions despite the Board's lack of a
quorum."'1 56 That "is a reasonable interpretation of the statute," the
Second Circuit wrote, as is the interpretation that a Board panel's
authority ends when the full Board loses its quorum. 157 Because the
Board's interpretation of section 3(b) need not be "the only possible
interpretation, nor even the interpretation deemed most reasonable by the
courts,"' 5 8 Snell held that the Board lawfully delegated to and convened
a three-member panel, and that the two members remaining after the end
of the term of one of the panel members constituted a section 3(b)
quorum even though the membership of the entire Board subsequently
dropped to two. 5 9
5. The Tenth Circuit's Interpretation
In Teamsters Local Union No. 523 v. NLRB, 160 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit joined the debate over the
decisionmaking authority of the two-member NLRB. There, a labor
union challenged the Board's determination that the union committed an
unfair labor practice when it insisted placing a worker at the bottom of
the bargaining unit's seniority roster because the worker was not a union
member. 161
Affirming the Board's ruling,162 the Tenth Circuit addressed the

154.
155.

Id.
Id.

156. Id.
157. Id. at 424. The court "commend[ed] the Board for its conscientious efforts to stay 'open
for business' in the face of vacancies that it did not create and for which it lacked the authority to
fill." Id. While one can applaud the agency for continuing to function and for making what it
deems to be the best of problematic circumstances, those considerations do not and should not
influence the outcome of the Chevron analysis.
158. Id. (quoting Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S.Ct. 1498, 1505 (2009)).
159. Id.
160. 590 F.3d 849 (10th Cir. 2009).
161. See Teamsters Local Union No. 523, 353 N.L.R.B No. 14 (Sep. 25, 2008), affd, 590 F.3d
849 (10th Cir. 2009).
162. The Board concluded that the union's conduct violated section 8(b)(2) of the Act, 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(2), and that the employer's acquiescence in the union's actions were prohibited by
section 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 8(a)(3). The employer did not appeal the Board's order.
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quorum issue under the Chevron deferential standard of review. The
court noted and summarized the First, Second, Fourth, and Seventh
Circuits' construction of section 3(b) and pointed out that three of the
circuits based their rulings on the plain language of that statutory
provision. 163 The court continued, the D.C. Circuit's Laurel Baye
decision was also based on that court's interpretation of the plain
language of section 3(b). 164 "We are hard-pressed in the wake of this
split of opinion in our respected sister circuits to find that the statutory
its face. Indeed, this very split is evidence of the
language is clear on 165
statute's ambiguity."
Proceeding to Chevron step two, the court reasoned that the
Board's interpretation of section 3(b) was a "permissible" interpretation
of the statute and was consistent with First, Fourth, and Seventh
Circuits' constructions of the quorum provision. Accordingly, the Tenth
Circuit deferred to the Board and upheld the agency's authority "to act
with only two members, both of whom were part of a three-member
' 66
group to which the Board validly delegated all of its authority.'
B. Three
In Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v. NLRB 167 the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
considered the employer's argument that the two-member NLRB was
have the authority to issue an unfair
not properly constituted and did 1not
68
order.
and
decision
labor practice
The challenged Board ruling was invalid, the employer argued,
because (1) the Board did not have the authority to delegate its power to
a three-member panel that the Board knew would be reduced to two as
the result of the expiration of one member's term, and (2) assuming that
the initial delegation was valid, the delegation to the panel did not
survive the loss of the NLRB's quorum. 169 As it had done in the cases
previously discussed, the Board's counter-argument posited that section
3(b) contains a general quorum requirement of three Board members,
with an exception for the delegation of agency powers to a three-

163.

See Teamsters Local 523, 590 F.3d at 852.

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id.; see infra note 174 and accompanying text.
Id. (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted).
Id.
564 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
See id.
See id. at472.
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70
member group subject to a two-member quorum requirement. 1
The employer's second argument convinced the court that the
Board's order was not lawfully issued. The District of Columbia Circuit
focused on the interaction between section 3(b)'s delegation, vacancy,'17
and quorum provisions.172 Section 3(b) mandates that "three members
of the Board shall, at all times, constitute a quorum of the Board"; 173 in
the court's view, the Board's position ignored this Board quorum (as
distinguished from panel quorum) requirement.174 The delegee quorum
provision setting the quorum of a three-member Board panel at two
members "does not eliminate the requirement that a quorum of the
Board is three members. Rather, it states' 1only that the quorum of any
three-member delegee group shall be two. 75
The court then reasoned that the text following the Board quorum
provision-"except that two members shall constitute a quorum" of any
three-member panel-"is therefore present in the statute only to indicate
that the delegee group's ability to act is measured by a different
numerical value.' ' 176 Reading the Board quorum and delegee quorum
provisions harmoniously, the court stated that "the result is clear: a
three-member Board may delegate its powers to a three-member group,
so long as the Board
and this delegee group may act with two members
' 77
quorum requirement is, 'at all times,' satisfied."'
Did Congress intend that a Board reduced to two active members
would be authorized to act as if the agency had a quorum of the full

170. See id.
171. The vacancy provision provides that "[a] vacancy in the Board shall not impair the right
...National Labor
of the remaining members to exercise all of the powers of the Board.
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (2006). While that provision could be read as suggesting "the
Board's ability to act is impaired if there is more than one vacancy on the Board," the court
considered section 3(b)'s vacancy and quorum provisions "in tandem" and determined that "it is
clear that the vacancy provision allows the Board to function fully with at most two vacancies. That
is the maximum number of vacancies that the Board can sustain and still maintain a quorum."
LaurelBaye Healthcare,564 F.3d at 475.
172. Laurel Baye Healthcare,564 F.3d at 475.
173. 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (emphasis added); see also 564 F.3d at 473 ("A modifying phrase as
unambiguous as this denotes that there is no instance in which the Board quorum requirement may
be disregarded.").
174. See Laurel Baye Healthcare, 564 F.3d at 472. The court argued that the Board's
interpretation of section 3(b) violated a "cardinal principle of interpretation" requiring the
construction of "a statute so that no provision is rendered inoperative or superfluous, void or
insignificant." Id. (citation omitted).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at472-73; see also id. at 473 ("[T]he Board cannot by delegating its authority
circumvent the statutory Board quorum requirement, because this requirement must always be
satisfied.").
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complement of five members (i.e., three members)? The reasoning
supporting the District of Columbia Circuit's negative answer to that
question warrants quotation:
Though the delegee group quorum provision is preceded by the
prepositional phrase "except that," . . . Congress' use of differing
object nouns within the two quorum provisions indicates clearly that
each quorum provision is independent from the other.
The
establishment of a two-member quorum of a subordinate group does
not logically require any change in the provision mandating a threemember quorum for the Board as a whole. In fact, it does not seem
odd at all that a sub-unit of any body would have a smaller quorum
number than the quorum of the body as a whole. Quorums, after all,
are usually majorities. A majority of three is smaller than a majority of
five. It therefore defies logic as well as the text of the statute to argue,
as the Board does, that a Congress which explicitly imposed a
requirement for a three-member quorum "at all times" would in the
same sentence allow the Board to reduce its78operative quorum to two
without further congressional authorization.
Additionally, the court opined that agency and corporate law
supported its construction of section 3(b). The delegated authority of an
agent ends at the time of the suspension of the powers of the entity
bestowing authority on the agent; 179 the agent's power ceases when the
delegating authority resigns or is terminated;180 and the powers of a
delegating board of directors are suspended when the membership of the
board does not meet a quorum requirement. 181 Thus, the authority of a
"board-like entity . . . ceases the moment that vacancies or
disqualifications on the board reduce the board's membership below a
quorum."' 182 Applying this principle, Laurel Baye declared that the only
authority of the delegee committee created by section 3(b) "is that of the
Board. If the Board has no authority, it follows that the committee has
none. The delegee's authority to act on behalf of the Board therefore
ceased the moment the Board's membership dropped below its quorum
requirement of three members.' 8 3
In the remaining pages of its opinion, the court rejected the Board's

178. Id.
179. See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.07(4) (2006)).
180. See id. (citing 2 MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 504 (2008)).
181. Id. (citing FLETCHER, supra note 180, at § 421).
182. Id.
183. Id.
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argument that its authority to act with two members was supported by
District of Columbia Circuit precedent 84 and by the First Circuit's
decision in Northeastern Land Services. 85 Furthermore, the court
recognized "that the case before us presents a close question," and
conceded that the OLC's interpretation of ssection 3(b) and the Board's
desire to continue to exercise its decision-making function and not have
its "adjudicatory wheels grind to a halt" were not "entirely
indefensible.', 186 "Nevertheless, we may not convolute a statutory
scheme to avoid an inconvenient result. Our function as a court is to
interpret the statutory scheme as it exists, not as we wish it to be. Any
change to the statutory structure must come from the Congress, not the
courts.'

87

184. The Board relied on Railroad Yardmasters of Am. v. Harris, 721 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir.
1983), and Falcon Trading Group, Ltd. v. SEC, 102 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1996). In Yardmasters the
court held that two members of the three-member National Mediation Board ("NMB") lawfully
delegated power to one of that board's members. The quorum provision of the relevant statute
provided that "[t]wo of the members in office shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of the
business of the Board." 45 U.S.C. § 154 (2006) (quoted in Yardmasters, 721 F.2d at 1334).
Yardmasters noted that its holding was a narrow one and emphasized that, unlike the NLRB, the
NMB did not adjudicate unfair labor practices and enforce the rights of individual workers. See
Yardmasters, 721 F.2d at 1345. Limiting Yardmasters "to its statutory context," Laurel Baye
determined that Yardmasters "was not intended to apply in cases involving the adjudication of
unfair labor practices, such as the case now before us." Laurel Baye Healthcare,564 F.3d at 474.
Falcon Trading similarly rejected a challenge to a two-member ruling by the Securities and
Exchange Commission. See generally Falcon, 102 F.3d 579. An SEC-promulgated quorum rule
provided that a quorum of that five-member commission "shall consist of three members; provided,
however, that if the number of Commissioners in office is less than three, a quorum shall consist of
the members in office." 17 C.F.R. § 200.41 (2009). The Falcon Trading court held that "[i]f not
otherwise constrained by statute, an agency sufficiently empowered by its enabling legislation may
create its own quorum rules." Falcon, 102 F.3d at 582. Laurel Baye correctly pointed out that
Congress gave the SEC but not the NLRB the power to make quorum rules. "Congress provided
that a quorum of the Board is three members. The Board does not have three members. It cannot
act." Laurel Baye Healthcare,564 F.3d at 475.
185. The District of Columbia Circuit argued that the issue before it was not the same as the
one decided by the First Circuit-the validity of a three-member delegee group subsequent to the
expiration of one member's term. Said the Laurel Baye court: "The determination of that issue is
not necessary to our decision, given that we have determined that the lack of a quorum on the Board
as a whole is the determining factor." Id. at 476. "In any event," the court concluded, "the First
Circuit's decisions are not binding precedent upon us. We are bound only by the decisions of our
circuit and the Supreme Court." Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. The court suggested the possibility of a Board or Congressional response to the
quorum issue. "Perhaps a properly constituted Board, or the Congress itself, may also minimize the
dislocations engendered by our decision by ratifying or otherwise reinstating the rump panel's
previous decisions, including the case before us." Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2009

31

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 2

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 27:1t3

C. Two or Three?
The court decisions discussed in the preceding section display a
variety of interpretive approaches to solving the section 3(b) quorum
puzzle. Four courts of appeals, the First, Fourth, Seventh, and District of
Columbia Circuits, found their answers in the "plain meaning" of the
statutory text. But those courts split 3-1 on the operative meaning of the
text in the context of litigation presenting the question whether the twomember panels decisions and orders were enforceable. The Second
Circuit, seeing a statutory ambiguity as evidenced by the First Circuit's
and District of Columbia Circuit's different "plain meaning"
constructions of section 3(b),188 did not side with either of its sister
circuits' plain meaning readings. Instead, the Second Circuit invoked
Chevron and deferred to what it believed to be the Board's reasonable
interpretation of the statute, one that permitted the two members to issue
decisions even through there was no quorum of the full NLRB.189 The
Tenth Circuit also invoked and applied Chevron; having found statutory
ambiguity in the circuit split on the quorum issue, that court similarly
deferred to the Board.
Does section 3(b) authorize a two-member quorum to exercise the
decisionmaking of the Board? Or does that section mandate that the
Board's authority, and the authority of the group to which it has
delegated power, ends in the event the agency has two and only two
active members?' 90 Is the pertinent quorum number two (a majority of a
three-member panel) or three (a majority of the five-member NLRB)?
What did Congress intend? What exactly did Congress say? Did
Congress have any discemable or discoverable purpose relevant to
and/or suggestive or dispositive of the quorum question? Should the
courts defer to Chairman Liebman's and Member Schaumber's (not
surprising) position that their decisions are the authorized and official
188.
189.

See Snell Island v. NLRB, 568 F.3d 410, 418 (2009).
Id. at 415.

190. See John C. Truesdale, Battling Case Backlogs at the NLRB: The ContinuingProblem of
Delays in Decision Making and the Clinton Board's Response, 16 LAB. LAW. 1 (2000). The author
of this article was a Board member during the Carter administration and a member and chairman in
the Clinton administration. Discussing the problem of Board member turnover and vacancies,
Truesdale wrote: "The problem was at its worst in the first year of the Clinton presidency when the
Board actually fell to two members, less than the necessary quorum." Id. at 6; see also John E.
Higgins, Jr., Labor Czars-Commissars-KeepingWomen in the Kitchen-The Purposeand Effects
of the Administrative Changes Made by Taft-Hartley, 47 CATH. U. L. REv. 941, 954 (1998) (the
author, a career NLRB attorney, notes that in "a short period in 1993, the Board actually fell to two
members, one short of its statutory quorum"); id. at 954 n.43 ("During this period, the Board could
not act on contested cases. Anticipating the loss of a quorum, the Board delegated the [injunctive]
authority to the General Counsel.").
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acts of a properly constituted agency?
If section 3(b) "provides a judge with a genuine textual command,"
be it a required quorum of a panel or a quorum of the full Board, the
judge must obey that command.' 91 In the absence of "firm textual
92
guidance" or clear precedent, however, the judge must make a choice.
Is the correct or best or better choice a quorum of two or three? Much
rides on the answer to that consequential question: hundreds of twomember decisions could have been wrongly issued by a panel not
empowered to adjudicate and decide cases.
1. The "Plain Meaning" Analytic
Does section 3(b) have a "plain meaning"?193 The statute makes
two references to "quorum" that are consistent with the common
understanding and usual dictionary definition and use of that term: a
majority of a body or entity. 194 For example, the United States
Constitution provides that "a Majority of each [House] shall constitute a
Quorum to do Business."' 195 And by statute and institutional rules, six
members of the United States Supreme Court constitute a quorum.19 6
But the question still remains: are the two active Board members
authorized to decide cases because they are a quorum of the delegee
group, or are they not authorized to issue decisions and orders because
there is no three-member-minimum quorum of the full NLRB?
The District of Columbia Circuit's interpretation and application of
section 3(b) in Laurel Baye is the best plain-meaning reading of the
statute. The court determined that section 3(b) has four separate
provisions: (1) delegation, (2) vacancy, (3) the "at all times" threemember quorum of the Board, and (4) the two-member quorum of the
three-member delegee group.' 97 Reading and giving effect to each and
all of these provisions, Laurel Baye did not render invisible or

191. Neuborne, supra note 2, at 43.
192. Id.
193. On plain meaning textual analysis, see supra notes 21, 27 and accompanying text.
194. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1370 (9th ed. 2009); FTC v. Flotill Prods., Inc., 389 U.S.

179, 183 (1967) (in the absence of a statutory provision "a majority of a quorum constituted of a
simple majority of a collective body is empowered to act for the body").
195. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl.I (bracketed material added); see also United States Senate
Rule VI ("A quorum shall consist of a majority of the Senators duly chosen and swom.").
196. See 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) ("The Supreme Court of the United States shall consist of a
Chief Justice of the United States and eight associate justices, any six of whom shall constitute a
quorum."); SUP. CT. R. 4 ("Six Members of the Court constitute a quorum.").
197. See Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 469, 470-71 (D.C.
Cir. 2009).
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inoperative the full Board quorum requirement in effect "at all times,"
including before and after- delegation. 198 Recognizing that section 3(b)
speaks of two separate and independent quorum provisions, the court
determined that two active members did not and could not satisfy the
statute's Board-quorum mandate of three. 99
Compare and contrast Laurel Baye's plain meaning analysis with
that of the First, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits. In Northeastern Land
Services the First Circuit (after stating, confusingly, that "[w]e owe some
deference to the agency's view") 200 grounded its approach in the "plain
text" of section 3(b), and referenced that section's delegation, vacancy,
and two-member delegee group quorum provisions. 20 1 Notably absent
from the court's analysis is the three-member Board quorum provision
mandating the minimum number of members the Board itself must have
"at all times." Because the court's "plain text" reading did not include a
provision critical to discerning the applicative meaning of section 3(b),
the implications arising from Congress' "at all times" language are not
addressed in the court's opinion.
The Seventh Circuit's New Process Steel decision and the Fourth
Circuit's ruling in Narricot Industries exhibit and suffer from the same
interpretive flaw. Recall that the Seventh Circuit concluded that the
"plain meaning" of section 3(b) supported the NLRB's delegation of
agency authority to three members, and that two members of that group
of three constitute a quorum.20 2 That is a correct reading and
interpretation of the statute as far as it goes.20 3 But the issue presented to
the court was not the quorum of two for the delegee group but the lack
of a quorum of three members seated on the NLRB. As did the First
Circuit, the Seventh Circuit's analysis focused solely on the former and
did not discuss or shed any light on why the latter did not de-authorize
the Board and, consequently, the delegee panel. And the Fourth Circuit,
198. Id. at 472-75.
199. Id. at473-75.
200. Ne. Land Servs., Ltd. v. NLRB, 560 F.3d 36, 40 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). The First Circuit's reference to
Chevron deference and what the court means by "some deference" are problematic. If, as the court
concluded, the plain text of section 3(b) did not impair the right of the two-member quorum to
exercise the Board's powers, then at Chevron step one Congress "has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue," and no deference to the agency is required. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. And is
"some deference" the same as or something less than the agency's "permissible construction the
statute" if the analysis reaches Chevron step two? Id. at 843.
201. Ne. Land Servs., 560 F.3d at 40.
202. See New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 840, 845-46 (7th Cir. 2009); see also
supra notes 49-64 and accompanying text.
203. See Snell Island SNF LLC v. NLRB, 568 F.3d 410, 419 (2d Cir. 2009) (Board's
December 2007 delegation to three-member panel "was lawfully constituted in the first instance").
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noting its agreement with the conclusions reached by the First and
Seventh Circuits, problematically rendered inoperative section 3(b)'s "at
all times" language.2 °4
A court engaged in the interpretive enterprise must recognize and
consider all of the terms and provisions of a statute before declaring
"plain meaning" and employing that meaning to resolve a litigated
dispute. Laurel Baye's reading did just that and does not suffer from the
aforementioned deficiencies of the First, Seventh, and Fourth Circuits'
contrary analyses and conclusions as to the "plain meaning" of section
3(b).
2. Legislative History and Purpose
Moving beyond statutory text, in New Process Steel and Snell
Island the Seventh and Second Circuits determined that the legislative
history of the Taft-Hartley Act reveals a Congressional intent to increase
the efficiency of the Board.2 °5 Both courts opined that the expansion of
the Board's membership from three to five members enhanced the
agency's efficiency, 0 6 and that nothing in the legislative history
suggested that the Board was prohibited from operating with a quorum
of two. 20 7 In addition, both courts looked to statutory purpose. New
Process Steel concluded that "[t]he purpose of the [Taft-Hartley Act]
revisions . . . was to allow the NLRB to hear more cases" and that
forbidding a two-member quorum to sit when the Board has two or more
vacancies "would frustrate the purposes of the act, not further it."20 8
Snell Island expressed the view that "one of the purposes of the TaftHartley amendments was to increase the Board's efficiency. 2 0 9
Even if one agrees that legislative history demonstrates or at least
suggests that the intent and purpose of the Taft-Hartley Act was the
promotion of the Board's efficiency, it is by no means clear that this
productivity-enhancement rationale supports the argument that a twomember panel may continue to decide cases when the Board itself loses
its quorum. The Second Circuit rightly noted that this history "does not
definitively answer" the question of the panel's authority in the postDecember 2007 delegation and circumstances discussed in this article.

204. Narricot Indus., L.P. v. NLRB, 587 F.3d 654, 659-60 (4th Cir. 2009).

205.
statutory
206.
207.

See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text for discussion of intentionalism and
interpretation.
See supra notes 98-102, 134-38 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 90-97, 123-33 and accompanying text.

208. New Process Steel, 564 F.3d at 847.

209. Snell Island,568 F.3d at 423.
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Thus, the creation of a delegee panel system does not inexorably lead to
the conclusion that a Board with less than three members is authorized to
decide cases.
3. To Defer or Not to Defer?
While the First Circuit's Northeastern Land decision made a
passing reference to the Chevron standard of review,21 ° the Second
Circuit's Snell Island ruling employed the Chevron two-step review
standard and held that the Board's position "is a reasonable
interpretation of the statute. 2 1' To what did the court defer?
The Second Circuit's opinion noted that "[a]nticipating that no
replacement appointments were forthcoming, and that it would lose its
three-member quorum, the Board delegated all of its powers to a threemember panel consisting of Liebman, Schaumber, and Kirsanow,
effective December 28, 2007. '' 212 According to the court, the Board
"relied on the plain language of the Act ' 2 13 and on:
[T]he March 4, 2003 opinion issued by the Office of Legal Counsel of
the U.S. Department of Justice (OLC) in response to the Board's May
16, 2002 request for OLC's opinion whether the Board may issue
decisions during periods when three or more of the five seats on the
Board are vacant. OLC's opinion concluded that "if the Board
delegated all of its powers to a group of three members, that group
could continue to issue decisions and orders as long as a quorum of
two members remained."

OLC's opinion stands for the proposition that the Board has the
authority to issue two-member decisions and orders, but that it is
within the 4 Board's discretion whether or not to exercise that
21
authority.

As noted in the OLC's opinion, the Board "agreed to be bound by"
215
the OLC's determination.
Recall the earlier discussion in which it was noted that Chevron's

210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Ne. Land Servs., Ltd. v. NLRB, 560 F.3d 35, 40 (1st Cir. 2009).
Snell Island, 568 F.3d at 424; supranotes 134-59 and accompanying text.
Id. at 412 (alteration in original).
Id.
Id. (citing Dec. 20, 2007 Minutes of Board Action).
See Quorum Requirements, supra note 5, at 4 n. 1.
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step two instructs that "if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect
to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. ' 216 And in
its post-Chevron decision in United States v. Mead217 the Supreme Court
explained that an agency's implementation of a statutory provision
"qualifies for Chevron deference when . . .the agency interpretation

claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of' that agency's
delegated authority.218 The Court held that "[d]elegation of such
authority may be shown in a variety of ways, as by an agency's power to
engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking, or by some
other indication of a comparable congressional intent. 21 9 Mead stated,
further, that the "fair measure of deference to an agency administering
its own statute var[ies] with circumstances" with courts "look[ing] to the
degree of the agency's care, its consistency, formality, and relative
expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the agency's position. 220
Snell Island did not defer to an NLRB' interpretation and
application of section 3(b) done in contested litigation and adjudication
of the quorum issue, or to a quorum rule formulated and implemented
pursuant to the Board's rulemaking authority. 221 Rather, the court
deferred to a Board that requested and agreed to be bound by the OLC's
2003 opinion recognizing the authority of two members to decide cases
while three of the agency's seats are vacant. 2222 The OLC's opinion may
be a plausible reading of section 3(b), and it is not surprising that the
Board relied on an opinion which allows the agency to continue to
223
function with only two of five members. 22
But that reliance on the
OLC's position is decidedly not the Board's own construction of section
3(b). Compelled Board acceptance of the OLC's view is not and should
in no way be equated with an independent assessment and discretionary
determination of the quorum issue reflecting the Board's expertise,
informed judgment, and articulated and persuasive reasoning and
explanation. Judicial deference under these circumstances does not
satisfy the requirements and further the goals of the Chevron regime.
To what did the Tenth Circuit defer in Teamsters Local Union No.
216. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
217.
218.

533U.S. 218(2001).
Id. at 226-27.

219. Id. at 227.
220. Id. at 228 (bracketed material added).
221. See 29 U.S.C. § 156 (2006) ("The Board shall have authority from time to time to make,
amend, and rescind, in a manner prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act, such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act.").
222. See Snell Island SNF v. NLRB, 568 F.3d 410,412 (2d Cir. 2009).
223. See id. at412.
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523? Noting the differing views in the federal court of appeals, the
Tenth Circuit found Chevron ambiguity in the circuit split and took no
sides in the debate over the best or better reading of the plain language
of section 3(b). While a circuit split on the issue of the meaning of the
plain language of a statutory provision can be suggestive of Chevron
ambiguity, the Tenth Circuit's move to Chevron step two was taken
without any independent analysis of the initial Chevron determination:
whether Congress had spoken directly to the issue presented in the
section 3(b) quorum cases. Thus, the court took no position on the
question whether the two-member NLRB is authorized by section 3(b)'s
plain language. That is not to say that the court could not or would not
have ultimately deferred, as it did, to the NLRB; it is to say that an
examination of the text, and an explanation of why the plain language
thereof does or does not mandate authorization or deauthorization of the
two-member Board, could have shed useful analytical light on the proper
resolution of the important quorum issue.
IV. CONCLUSION

This essay argues that the best reading of section 3(b) is one which
terminates the NLRB's power to decide cases when there are only two
active Board members. This posited best reading of the statute is not
presented as the only "right" answer, for defensible interpretations of
section 3(b) have been presented by the courts addressing what Laurel
Baye correctly calls the close question of the validity of the challenged
224
As evidenced by the cases discussed in the
two-member rulings.
preceding part, close questions are answered differently by courts
employing various interpretive theories and methodologies. Given the
NLRB's longstanding tradition of not acquiescing to the contrary view
of a federal court of appeals, such as that expressed in the District of
Columbia Circuit's Laurel Baye decision,22 5 only the Supreme Court can
definitively resolve the circuit split discussed in this essay, declare a
uniform approach, and answer the section 3(b) quorum question.
224. See Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 469, 476 (D.C. Cir.
2009).
225. See Ross E. Davies, Remedial Nonacquiescence, 89 IOWA L. REV. 65, 98 (2003) ("The
NLRB's long tradition of nonacquiescence is perhaps best viewed as a by-product of the Board's
commitment to act on its own interpretation of the federal labor laws, come what may from the
federal courts of appeals."); Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal
Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 706 (1989) ("the Board has reserved the right to
continue its disagreement with circuit court rulings that are contrary to the Board's interpretation of
national labor policy, even where it is not prepared to seek Supreme Court review in the particular
case.").

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol27/iss1/2

38

